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POINT I 
THE JURY DID NOT FIND THE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND 
BRANDISHING COUNTS TO BE BASED UPON "DIFFERENT 
CONDUCT." COUNSEL WAS THEREFORE INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT 
SEEKING TO DISMISS OR MERGE THE BRANDISHING COUNT. 
The State is wedded to the proposition that the charges were based on 
separate conduct. See, e.g., Br. Resp., 24. There is, however, no support for this in 
the charging document. The Information in this case mentions no specific victim 
in either the third degree felony Aggravated Assault (Dangerous Weapon) count or 
the class A misdemeanor Threatening with or Using a Dangerous Weapon in a 
• Fight or Quarrel count. R.1-3. The Information is included in Addendum A. The 
defendant was found guilty of both counts. R.166-167. The verdict forms are 
included in Addendum C. No particular victim is mentioned in the verdict forms. 
Neither is there any guidance from the jury instruction, R.199, Addendum B. 
The State accurately states that the Aggravated Assault elements instruction 
i) specifically names Hugo Holguin as a victim. R.196. The Threatening elements 
instruction, however, names no particular victim. R.199. So while, factually, it 
may be true that Holguin was the primary victim of the Aggravated Assault charge, 
the State's argument that such a verdict precludes a finding by the jury that those 
same facts also formed the basis of the Threatening conviction is inaccurate. 
The State seeks to limit the Threatening charge to the concept that it must be 
based upon the same conduct as the Aggravated Assault in order to be subject to 
1 
dismissal or a lesser included offense. Br. Resp. 14-24. But the "more restrictive 
standard," the "necessarily-included standard," is "limited to cases where the • 
prosecution requests the instruction." Br. Aplt., 16, citing State v. Baker, 671 P .2d 
152, 156 (Utah 1983); State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, if12-13, 62 P.3d 444. 
That did not occur and the defendant conceded that it is not a statutorily lesser 
included offense, and should not be analyzed under that rubric. Br. Aplt. at 16. 
The defendant concurs that, "The ( threatening) offense requires proof that • 
the defendant drew or exhibited any dangerous weapon in an angry and threatening 
manner, and did not do so in necessary self-defense." State v. Phelps, 2005 UT 
App 451, cited Br. Resp., 17. The State's further reference to State v. Cravens, 
2000 UT App 344, 15 P.3d 635, Br. Resp., 17, is of little value and unhelpful. 
There can be little dispute, under whatever view of the various versions of • 
the testimony of the witnesses, that Mr. Calvert's actions were part of a single 
criminal episode. "A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for 
all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; when the same act of 
a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be 
punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence 
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1). 
2 
• 
In order for a charge to be deemed a lesser included offense, "there must be 
(i) some overlapping of the statutory elements of the offenses. If that overlapping 
exists and the evidence is ambiguous and susceptible to alternative interpretations, 
the trial court must give a lesser included offense instruction if any one of the 
alternative interpretations provides both a "rational basis for a verdict acquitting 
the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense." 
ti> State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d 551, 553-54 (Utah 1984). That language applies 
squarely to this case and is one reason that counsel should have moved to dismiss 
or later merge the Threatening charge into the Aggravated Assault. It is not 
intended that a defendant be punished for both the greater and the lesser charge, 
"when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish 
€1 offenses which may be punished in different ways under different provisions . . . " 
§ 76-1-402(1). 
It is well established that, "acts are separate if they are not necessary to each 
other or are sufficiently separated by time and space." Br. Resp., 17, citing State v. 
Chukes, 2003 UT App 155, ,r 21, 71 P.3d 624, 629. Certainly, here, the incident 
~ occurred within a brief period of time and all within the same space, Mr. Calvert's 
home. To say the least the evidence was ambiguous, warranting the threatening 
charge to be treated as a lesser included offense. Chukes and the cases it relies 
upon support Calvert's argument. Br. Resp., 19. The State's reference to State v. 
3 
• 
Roth, 2001 UT 103, 37 P.3d 1099, involving convictions of possession of 
methamphetamine and operating a clandestine laboratory, is sufficiently attenuated • 
from the instant matter that it provides no guidance. Br. Resp., 19. 
The State argues that there was a "clear break" in time between the offenses, 
• 
and that counsel did not argue that pointing the gun at Hugo was also the basis of 
the Threatening charge. Br. Resp. 20. It is no surprise that defense counsel failed 
in this regard, as he missed altogether the dismissal/lesser included/merger 
argument which is made here on appeal. Such a failure is the essence of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Discussing the issue of multiplicity, State v. Ras about, 2013 UT App 71, 
299 P .3d 625 and State v. Hattrich, 2013 UT App 177, ljf 33, 317 P .3d 433, cited by 
the State, Br. Resp., 21, were discussed extensively in defendant's opening brief. <i 
Br. Aplt., 19-21. The State's position, citing those cases as authority, is that 
"multiplicity forbids the State from charging a single offense as multiple offenses -
that is, from charging multiple counts of the same offense. Br. Resp., 21. To that 
the defendant reiterates that the statutes themselves must be analyzed to determine, 
under the facts of the case, whether a charge is multiplicitous, specifically, "the • 
'course of conduct' as opposed to individual acts' is what is prohibited." There 
can be "but one penalty," even though different statutes may be involved. Br. 
4 
Aplt., 20, citing Rasabout, Hattrick, as well as State v. Oldroyd, 685 P.2d at 554. 
Br. Aplt., 19-21. 
It is virtually impossible to second-guess what evidence the jury chose to 
underpin its Threatening verdict. Utah R. Evid. Rule 606 states, inter alia, as 
follows: 
(b) During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment. 
( 1) Prohibited testimony or other evidence. -- During an 
inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may 
not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred 
during the jury's deliberations; the effect of anything on that 
juror's or another juror's vote; or any juror's mental processes 
concerning the verdict or indictment. The court may not 
receive a juror's affidavit or evidence of a juror's statement on 
these matters. 
(2) Exceptions. -- A juror may testify about whether: 
(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly 
brought to the jury's attention; or 
(B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear 
on any Juror. 
As the State points out, there was a single criminal episode in which, 
depending upon the witness, the Threatening charge could well have been founded 
upon pointing of the gun at Hugo Holguin in the presence of others. Br. Resp., 22. 
Indeed, it is as likely that was the case as any other scenario. Consequently 
counsel was remiss in failing to bring the multiplicity issue to the attention of the 
court, so that the Threatening charge could either be clarified by instruction to the 
5 
jury, dismissed as multiplicitous, or a determination made as to whether to deem it 
a lesser offense. 
The fact that the State indicates there were "multiple variants." Agreed. 
This fact simply supports the defendant's argument that the evidence was 
sufficiently ambiguous to warrant the Threatening charge to be treated as a lesser 
included offense. Br. Resp., 22, citing State v. Garrido, 2013 UT App 245, 314 
P.3d 1014. No attempt was made by counsel to capitalize on the single criminal 
episode nature of the circumstances, let alone the other possible scenarios which 
might have been argued. So it cannot be assumed that the court would not have 
taken some action consistent with counsel's requests, depending upon the option 
chosen. Inasmuch as the jury verdict cannot be impeached, Utah R. Evid. Rule 
606, it is prudent to conclude not only that the jury based its verdicts on the same (i 
facts, but that, in any event, the Threatening charge was lesser or should have 
merged under that doctrine. 
The State's reliance on State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, ,r 28, 65 P.3d 648, 
Br. Resp., 22-23, is also misplaced. Smith relied on State v. Oldroyd, supra, to 
support a claim of plain error. In Oldroyd, it was held that the defendant's use of a • 
weapon could have constituted either aggravated assault or threatening with a 
dangerous weapon and that the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on this 
lesser included offense, after the defendant requested such an instruction, was 
6 
reversible error. Id.,685 P.2d, ,r 29. The problem for the State with Smith is that, 
unlike the present matter, "Smith never requested such an instruction and 
maintained his innocence throughout the trial." ,r 29. But here, the State's 
reference to an "all or nothing" defense, Br. Resp., 24 n.4, is inapposite as that was 
not exploited by Calvert. He affirmatively contended that he did obtain and use a 
gun. R.284:61-62. Consequently, Smith is not of relevance. 
The State's reason for its reference to Menzies v. State, 2014 UT 40, ,r 222, 
344 P.3d 581, Br. Resp., 24, is unclear. In the paragraph referenced, the Supreme 
Court discusses the efficacy of the reasonable doubt instruction, having nothing to 
do with the instant matter. It is not otherwise apparent what this case establishes. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently laid the matter of when a lesser 
included offense instruction must be given: 
Even if the statutory elements of a lesser included offense overlap 
with those of the charged offense, "a defendant's right to a lesser 
included offense instruction is limited by the evidence and only 
justified where there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included 
offense." In making that determination, trial courts must "view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant" and cannot 
"weigh the evidence." Rather, "when the evidence is ambiguous and 
therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations, and one 
alternative would permit acquittal of the greater offense and 
conviction of the lesser, a jury question exists and the court must give 
a lesser included offense instruction at the request of the defendant." 
This standard assures that lesser-included-offense instructions serve 
their intended purpose of safeguarding defendant's constitutional right 
to a fair trial without "allow[ing] the jury to return a compromise, or 
other unwarranted verdict." 
7 
State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, ,r 22, 349 P.3d 712, 720 (Sup.Ct.) (emphasis added; 
internal citations omitted). Thus, for the reasons set forth herein, a lesser included 
offense was appropriate in lieu of a second count ( as well as a motion to merge). 
For the reasons set forth in defendant's opening brief and above, counsel 
was ineffective in failing to move to dismiss, delineate as a lesser included offense, 
or merge the Threatening charge. The defendant was prejudiced by the failure. 
POINT II 
THE CONVICTION FOR THREATENING WITH A DANGEROUS 
WEAPON MERGES WITH AGGRAVATED ASSAULT. COUNSEL WAS 
INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE TO MERGE AND THE 'I 
DEFENDANT WAS PREJUDICED. 
The State incorrectly asserts that merger can only occur in kidnapping or 
detention situations such as described in State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 994 P .2d • 
1243. Br. Resp., 25. This is inaccurate. The merger proposition was considered 
and rejected, but for reasons not pertaining to its inherent applicability or because 
it did not involve some form of detention, in a case involving burglary and 
homicide. State v. Tillman, 7 50 P .2d 546, 5 68-72 (Utah 1987)( affirming the death 
penalty); State v. Ross, 2007 UT 89, ~ 61, 174 P.3d 628 ("an underlying felony • 
that constitutes the aggravating circumstance merges with the conviction for 
aggravated murder pursuant to Utah Code section 76-5-202")(1n 2008 this statute 
was amended to state, "(a) Any aggravating circumstance described in Subsection 
8 
• 
(1) or (2) that constitutes a separate offense does not merge with the crime of 
aggravated murder." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(5)(a)&(b ). In any event the 
State's premise, that merger can only be statutory or confined to detention cases, is 
inaccurate. "We recognized, however, that "section 76-1-402 ... is not the only 
basis for finding that one set of facts may give rise to a merger of two or more 
separate crimes so as to preclude a multitude of convictions for essentially the 
• same conduct." State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ~ 30, 128 P.3d 1179. As the Court stated 
in Lee: 
In other words, we recognized that, in some factual scenarios, crimes 
may be so related that they must merge even though neither is a lesser 
included offense of the other under section 76-1-402. Where two 
crimes are defined narrowly enough that proof of one does not 
constitute proof of the other, but broadly enough that both may arise 
from the same facts, merger may be appropriate. Otherwise, a 
criminal defendant could be punished twice for conduct that amounts 
to only one offense, a result contrary to protections against double 
jeopardy in general, see State v. Harris, 2004 UT 103, P22, 104 P.3d 
1250, and the merger doctrine in particular, see State v. Lopez, 2004 
UT App 410, P8, 103 P .3d 153 ("Courts apply the merger doctrine as 
one means of alleviating the concern of double jeopardy that a 
defendant should not be punished twice for the same crime."). 
Id.,~31. Thus, the State's position that merger can only apply to 
• kidnapping/detention situations is completely erroneous. 
The merger issue, both statutory and otherwise, is discussed at great length 
in defendant's opening brief. See Br. Aplt. Point II, 23-27. Counsel's failure to 
move to merge was ineffective and prejudicial, for which reversal and remand is 
9 
appropriate. Also, as noted, this Court, however, has authority to effectuate the 
merger based upon Utah R.Crim. P. 22(e). See State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32,, ~ 
9,232 P.3d 1008, 1011. Br. Aplt., 27. 
POINT III 
• 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 404(b). 
As explained in defendant's opening brief, the extraneous bad act evidence 
allowed by the trial had a little tendency to substantiate the facts of the case at 
hand, and may simply have served to make the defendant look either weird, just a 
bad neighbor, or both. "The police report indicated that on October 28, 2008, Mr. 
Calvert called the police to report that he approached Little, told her to move, that 
she pushed and punched him, but she was drunk and fell on the ground. Br. Aplt. 
28; R.95. No gun was employed. Ms. "Little reported that he was taking pictures 
of her house, that she went outside he yelled at her, calling her names and "made 
• 
threats at my life like always." Id. He then attacked her, pushing her and hitting I) 
her twice in the head. Id." The charges never went to court and verifying which 
neighbor was the accurate reporter of the facts as they actually occurred would be 
an impossible task at the present time. The evidence, being the only other 
evidence not directly related to the instant offense, and therefore being likely to 
assume an exaggerated importance, should not have been admitted. It is error to 
admit evidence of which the only real value is to cause the jury to see Calvert as an 
10 
odd man and perhaps a dangerous one. See United States v. Klebig, 600 F.3d 700, 
• 722 (7th Cir. 2009). Such evidence is "propensity" evidence which is improper. 
Likewise, "a prior assault or battery conviction is immaterial to a self defense 
claim in a separate incident except to suggest conformity," and therefore improper. 
United States v. Commanche, 577 F .3d 1261, 1268 (10th Cir. 2009). The Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has also stated regarding such equivocal evidence, 
If weak circumstantial evidence of prior bad acts is admitted under 
Rule 404(b ), there is an inherent danger of prejudice to the defendant. 
The government cannot conduct a mini-trial on acts the defendant was 
never charged with under the guise of Rule 404(b ). The particular 
evidence at issue here may be relevant under Rule 401, but the 
probative value of such precarious evidence is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant under 
Rule 403. 
United States v. Temple, 862 F .2d 821, 824 (10th Cir. 1988). 1 The danger of the 
Little evidence is very clear. It simply demonstrated an unsubstantiated scenario 
showing "propensity" or "conformity," making him look odd, perhaps dangerous. 
Recently the Utah Supreme Court Stated this about Utah R. Evid., Rule 
404(b): 
"Rule 404(b) allows evidence of prior bad acts for noncharacter 
purposes, "such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." 
But the evidence "must clear several evidentiary hurdles before 
1 As the State acknowledges, "Utah courts consider sources interpreting a similar 
e or identical federal rule as persuasive authority of the meaning of Utah's rule. See, 
e.g., Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, ,I25, 216 P.3d 944." Br. Resp. 
at 33. 
11 
admission-rules 404(b ), 402, and 403." These requirements can be 
distilled into a three-part test: the prior bad-act evidence ( 1) must be 
"offered for a genuine, noncharacter purpose," (2) "must be relevant" 
to that noncharacter purpose, and (3) the "probative value of the 
evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice." Additionally, as we recently clarified in State v. Lucero, 
"matters of conditional relevance must also meet the preponderance of 
the evidence standard under" rule 104(b ). " 
State v. Reece, 2015 UT 45, ,r 57, 349 P.3d 712, 731 citing State v. Lucero, 2014 
UT 15, ,r 13,328 P.3d 841. Rule 104(b) states: 
(b) Relevance that depends on a fact. -- When the relevance of 
evidence depends on whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced 
sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist. The court may 
admit the proposed evidence on the condition that the proof be 
introduced later. 
( c) Conducting a hearing so that the jury cannot hear it. -- The court 
must conduct any hearing on a preliminary question so that the jury 
cannot hear it if: 
( 1) the hearing involves the admissibility of a confession; 
(2) a defendant in a criminal case is a witness and so requests; 
or 
(3) justice so requires. 
• 
• 
Utah R. Evid. Rule 104. Lucero is clear that, "evidence of prior bad acts must be • 
relevant and offered for a genuine, noncharacter purpose; furthermore, the 
probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice. Lucero at ,r 13. Further, "matters of conditional relevance 
must also meet the preponderance of the evidence standard under Utah Rule of 
Evidence 104(b ). " Id. 
12 
In this case, given the inapplicability of the doctrine of chances, as discussed 
• m defendant's opening brief, Point III, and below, the particular isolated 
extraneous offense evidence being relatively ordinary in the realm of human 
affairs, and the requirement that the Court give appropriate consideration to the 
~ 
factors set forth in State v. Shickles2, justice required that the court hold a hearing 
outside the presence of the jury to appropriately scrutinize those factors. Contrary 
• to the State's assertion that courts no longer consider the Schick/es factors, "(T)he 
court may consider a number of factors, including those the Supreme Court of 
Utah identified in State v. Shick/es: the strength of the evidence as to the 
commission of the other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the interval of 
time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of 
• alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury 
to overmastering hostility." Lucero at ,I 3 l(the Supreme Court has subsequently 
disavowed the "overmastering hostility" factor. See below). 
The 403 test is traditionally treated under a burden shifting analysis. If the 
evidence has no unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, or mislead, it is 
presumably admissible. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah Sup.Ct. 
1993 ). If, however, the evidence does have an unusual propensity to be unfairly 
prejudicial, the evidence's potential for unfair prejudice is presumed to outweigh its 
2 State v. Shick/es," 2014 UT 15, P 32,328 P.3d 841. 
13 
probativeness, and the burden is on the proponent to show that the evidence has 
unusual probative value. Id. "We reverse the presumption in favor of 
admissibility because these categories of evidence are "uniquely subject to being 
used to distort the deliberative process and skew a trial's outcome." Id. (internal 
citations omitted). Here, the evidence was obviously prejudicial, therefore the 
burden shifted to the State to establish that its probative value outweighed the risk 
of unfair prejudice. The State was and is unable to do that. Prejudice is defined • 
well as follows: 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when "it tends to have some adverse 
effect upon a defendant beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that 
justified its admission into evidence." United States v. Massino, 546 
F.3d 123, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)). If 
the other acts tend to prove a fact not in issue or "to excite emotions 
against the defendant," they create a prejudicial effect. United States 
v. Figueroa, 618 F .2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980). The district court 
abuses its discretion when it admits "other act" evidence with a high 
possibility of jury misuse but with only slightly more probative value 
than other evidence on the same issue. See McCall um, 5 84 F .3 d at 
477. 
United States v. Curley, 639 F.3d 50, 57 (2.d Cir. 2011). 
The State accurately notes that in assessing the Rule 403 factors in isolation, 
the Shick/es factors are not an appropriate measure. In other words, State v. • 
Reece's statement that, "Weighing the probative value and potentially unfair 
prejudicial effect of evidence involves a variety of considerations, including the 
factors we identified in State v. Shick/es," id. ,r 69, is at least, in part, incorrect. 
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The Utah Supreme Court ruled that, 
As we explained in State v. Lucero, albeit in a slightly different 
context, "courts are bound by the text of rule 403, not the limited list 
of considerations outlined in Shick/es." 2014 UT 15, P 32, 328 P.3d 
841. Thus, the governing legal standard for evaluating whether 
evidence satisfies rule 403 is the plain language of the rule, nothing 
more and nothing less. And while the district court's adherence in this 
case to the Shick/es factors is understandable given our prior 
pronouncements on this subject, it nevertheless represents an 
application of the wrong legal standard and, therefore, an abuse of 
discretion. 
State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, 12 (Sup.Ct.). Furthermore, the Cuttler Court wisely 
noted, with respect to the standard previously used, "overmastering hostility," that 
• it was far too strong a standard, 
Finally, it is inappropriate for a district court to ever consider whether 
evidence will lead a jury to "overmastering hostility." The language of 
rule 403 requires only that evidence not lead to unfair prejudice. 
• Overmastering hostility is both a stricter and looser metric by which 
to judge evidence under rule 403. Evidence may lead to prejudice in 
ways other than by rousing a jury to overmastering hostility. Also, 
overmastering hostility is much stronger language than the "unfair" 
language actually used in rule 403. Since the overmastering hostility 
factor under Shick/es is at best judicial gloss and at worst a substitute 
test for evidence's admissibility under rule 403, we now make clear 
that it is inappropriate for a court to consider the overmastering 
hostility factor in a rule 403 analysis. 
• State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, ~ 20 (Sup.Ct.) (Emphasis added). 
• 
The question that must be answered is whether the extraneous offense 
evidence is so probative as to outweigh the risk of unfair prejudice. Nevertheless, 
the Shick/es factors have not been totally abandoned. "Again, this is not to say that 
15 
the Shick/es factors, taken individually, have no place in a rule 403 analysis." 
Cuttler at ,I 19. 
In the instant case, it is difficult to understand how the extraneous evidence 
presented tended to show that in the instance for which Mr. Calvert was charged he 
did or did not fabricate a story or that he did or did not act in self-defense. 
Contrary to the State's position that it is a rarity, a prior altercation with a neighbor 
is a great deal more common than "brides in bathtubs." See Br. Resp., 36, 38.3 
Likewise, the evidence cannot be justified on the basis that State v. Cuttler, 2015 
UT 95 did away with the Shick/es factors. It did not. On the contrary the Supreme 
Court specifically stated as follows: 
With respect to the first assigned error-the use of the wrong legal 
standard-rule 403 instructs courts to exclude evidence "if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or Ci 
more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, 
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly 
presenting cumulative evidence." While weighing the evidence under 
this rule, courts may consider many factors, including some of those 
we identified in Shick/es. However, as we noted in State v. Lucero, in • 
the context of rule 404(b), the Shick/es factors should not limit the 
3 The State maintains that, "It is not often that one is falsely accused by one's 
neighbors of assaults and threats over trivial matters." Counsel for the State has 
no doubt been fortunate to have lived amongst highly evolved, civilized and 
genteel neighbors. The fact of the matter is that its assertion is sheer nonsense. 
Neighborhood disputes, often very heated, are extremely common. Defendant's 
counsel has tried numerous neighborhood dispute cases over the years, including 
disputes over water rights, boundaries, domestic, and many more mundane issues. 
It is not uncommon for people to become extremely feverish and resentful over the • 
most trivial slight, to make extremely inflammatory threats, to resort to violence in 
these cases, and to commit serious assaults. It is far from a unique circumstance. 
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considerations of a court when making a determination of evidence's 
admissibility under rule 403. 2014 UT 15, P 32, 328 P.3d 841. 
Instead, courts are "bound by the text of rule 403," and it is 
"unnecessary for courts to evaluate each and every [Shick/es] factor" 
in every context. Id. 
Cuttler at 118. The Shick/es factors are relevant and helpful in the vast majority of 
cases, but they are not a substitute for the analysis required by Rule 403. Id. at 1 
19 ("Again, this is not to say that the Shick/es factors, taken individually, have no 
place in a rule 403 analysis."). The problem in Cuttler was similar to but also very 
different from the problem in the instant matter. "Here, the district court relied 
exclusively on the Shick/es factors when determining the admissibility of the 
previous child molestation evidence under rule 403." Id. 121. 
In the instant matter the court relied entirely upon the doctrine of chances. 
As indicated in Appellant's opening brief, and by the complete lack of "brides in 
the bathtub" uniqueness previously discussed, a single commonplace and isolated 
instance, not by any means identical, simply cannot satisfy the doctrine of chances. 
Under State v. Lowther, 2015 UT App 180, 356 P.3d 173, the same four factors, 
materiality, similarity, independence, and frequency are utilized to discern both the 
• relevance of the proposed bad acts evidence and to weigh the evidence's probative 
value against its prejudicial effect. Lowther at 1 19 n.3, referencing State v. 
Labrum, 2014 UT App 5, ,r 28, 318 P.3d 1151 (explaining that for a rule 403 
analysis in cases relying on the doctrine of chances, Verde displaces the Shick/es 
17 
factors, but also noting that one of the Shick/es factors involves weighing the 
similarities in the evidence). 
The Supreme Court defined the doctrine of chances as a theory of relevance 
under which rule 404(b) "evidence of prior similar tragedies or accusations" may 
be admitted to support an "inference that the chance of multiple similar 
occurrences arising by coincidence is improbable" as well as "a conclusion that one 
or some of the occurrences were not accidents or false accusations." State v. 
Verde, 2012 UT 60, ,r,r 50-51, 296 P.3d 67. In Lowther, three other women alleged 
that Lowther had "raped them under similar circumstances: they had attended a 
social gathering where they consumed alcohol; they went to sleep either drunk or 
tipsy; and they awakened to find [Lowther] forcefully penetrating them." Lowther, 
at ,r 2. Verde involved the State's introduction testimony of three men who claimed 
that Verde had sexually assaulted them when they were eighteen years old. Verde 
at ,r 3. These courts relied on the doctrine of chances to establish an "inference that 
the chance of multiple similar occurrences arising by coincidence is improbable" as 
well as that they were not accidents or false accusations. Verde at ,r,r 50-51. The 
single extraneous incident in the instant matter fails to establish the necessary 8 
factors: materiality, similarity, independence, and frequency. The doctrine of 
chances test used by the district court simply fails this test. Admission of this 
evidence was an abuse of discretion. State v. Lowther at ,r 8. It was unreasonably 
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prejudicial as well. Absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
~ favorable outcome and confidence in the verdict is undermined. State v. Perea, 
2013 UT 68, ,r 97, 322 P.3d 624, 646 (Sup.Ct.). 
Finally, while the dismissal of the justice court case in Holladay Justice 
Court, Case # 081000542, may not be a judgment on the merits, as having not been 
"completely, fully, and fairly litigated," as required by State v. Sommerville, 2013 
~ UT App 40, ,r 33, 297 P.3d 665, it is a reflection of the essential equivocal and 
weak nature of the witness, who failed to participate in the prior litigation, and the 
frailty of the evidence presented. See Holladay Justice Court docket, Addendum • 
D. Its prejudicial effect was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value. The 
error was harmful and the case should be reversed. 
~ POINTIV 
CALVERT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIM THAT THE JURY 
MIGHT HA VE BEEN EXPOSED TO IMPROPER MATERIAL DURING 
DELIBERATIONS BECAUSE THEY HAD ACCESS TO A PROSECUTION 
@ LAPTOP TO LISTEN TO A 911 CALL IS WELL TAKEN. 
This issue was thoroughly briefed in Point IV of the defendant's opening 
brief. The defendant is satisfied that it is sufficiently responsive to the State's 
argument that no further argument is required. The Court is referred to Point IV of 
the defendant's opening brief. 
CONCLUSION 
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For the foregoing reasons the defendant respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse his convictions. 
c e Bullen 
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF RULE 24 COMPLIANCE 
Appellant certifies pursuant to Rule 24(t)(l)(C) Utah R. App. P. that the foregoing 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Herschel Bullen, hereby certify that this --/.±day of April, 2016 I caused to be 
hand-delivered an original and 7 copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals 
and a searchable pdf CD, 450 South State Street, 5th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114; 
and 2 copies along with a searchable pdf CD mailed, United States Postal Service, 
postage prepaid to the following: 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHADLEY KEITH CALVERT 
DOB: 09/04/1969 
AKA: Jeff Burton 
6656 South 5500 West 





Screened by: JENNIFER VALENCIA 
Assigned to: WEST JORDAN TO BE 
ASSIGNED 
DAO# 12014605 
ECR Status: Non-ECR 
Initial Appearance: August 1, 2012 at 8:30 AM 
Warrant/Release: Sportsman's Bail Bonds 
NO ADDITIONAL WARRANT 
OR SUMMONS REQUESTED 
INFORMATION 
Case No. !~{9o(.o~39 
The undersigned Detective C. Hahn - WEST JORDAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
Agency Case No. 12H009833, upon a written affidavit states on information and belief that the 
defendant, CHADLEY KEITH CAL VERT, committed the crime of: 




AGGRAVATED ASSAULT F3 (DANGEROUS WEAPON), 76-5-103(1) UCA~ THIRD 
DEGREE FELONY, as follows: That on or about July 16, 2012 at 6656 South 5500 West, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant did commit assault as defined in Utah Code 
Section 76-5-102 and used 
(a) a dangerous weapon as defined in Utah Code Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, with the use of a 
dangerous weapon in the commission or furtherance of the crime. 
COUNT2 
THREATENING WITH OR USING DANGEROUS WEAPON IN A FIGHT OR QUARREL 
(DANGEROUS WEAPON), 76-10-506 UCA, CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, as follows: That 
on or about July 16, 2012 at 6674 South 5500 West, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
defendant did , in the presence of two or more persons, draw or exhibit a dangerous weapon in an 
angry or threatening manner or unlavrfully use a dangerous weapon in any fight or quarrel when 
such an act was not necessary for self defense or defense of another, with the use of a dangerous 
weapon in the commission or furtherance of the crime. 
THIS INFORMATION rs BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Detective C. Hahn, A.C., K.H., A.H., A.H, A.H., Hugo Holguin, Officer B. Jex, Officer 
T. McBride, K.P., A.R., Officer D. Saunders, Yolanda Trujillo 
AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE: 
Your declarant bases this Information upon the following: 
The statement of Officer Jex, West Jordan Police Department that on July 16, 2012 he 
responded to a man with a gun call at a location in Salt Lake County. That he spoke with the 
defendant, CHADLEY KEITH CALVERT, who admitted to having a gun with a laser in his 
garage and gave permission to retrieve it. That Officer McBride retrieved the gw1 from the 
garage and it had one round in the chamber. That he collected witness statements from the 
children and adults who were threatened with the gun. 
The statement of A.C., age 13, that while he was walking with his friends at a location in 
Salt Lake County, CALVERT got mad at him for walking on his propetty. That CALVERT 
pulled out a gun and threatened to beat them up. 
The statement of A. H., age 15, that while he imd his cousins were walking to get their 
bikes, CALVERT was yelling at them, telling them to get out of here and screaming that he was 
going to kick all of their "assess." That A.H. left to go get their parents and when he returned, 
CALVERT had a bll.111 with a laser on it and was aiming it at his uncle, Hugo Holguin. 
• 
STATE vs CHADLEY KEITH CALVERT 
DAO# 12014605 
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The statement of Hugo Holguin, that he approached CAL VERT and asked him what was 
going on. That CAL VERT was very mad and yelling at everyone. That CALVERT told 
Holguin that he needed to shut up, go back to his house and mind his own business. That 
CALVERT had a gun the whole time he was yelling and pointed it at Holguin. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78B-5-705 (2008) I 
declare under criminal penalty of the State of Utah that the 
foregoing is true and correct to the best of my belief and 
knowledge. 
Executed on: ___ j 4"--'\'--7-r--1!iJ~~"--...... , l;;:;...{.)~l_2-_ r I 
~ ~-
DB+eCTIVe c. HAHM St; 1 . --r: q?~ 
Declarant ..,, 
Authorized for presentment and filing 
SIM GILL, District A omey 
Tab B 
INSTRUCT.ION NO. 1, l 
Before you can convict the defendant, ,Chadley Keith Calvert, of the offense of 
Threatening With or Usin~ a Dangerous Weapon in:afight or Quarrel, a~·charged in-Co.µnt Itof 
I 
the informdtion,.:you must find :from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable· doubt each and 
'every one ~f 1;he followiQ.g elements of that offense, occurring on .or apo:ut the 16th d~y of July, 
2012, in_.Sa)t Lake County,.State oflJtah; 
i 
1. ' That the .defendant, Chadley Keith Calvert was in the ·presence of two or more 
p.eople~ and 
2. Drew or exhibited any dangerous weapon, to wit a handgun; :and 
3. .(~) Did so in an angry or threatening manner, .or (b) .unlawfully used the same in 
any fight a~ quarrel 
u: ~er-cm:e.fµl.consjder~tjon .of aU .ofthe evidence in this case, you are .con:vinced.:ofthe 
truth;.of eadh and every·,one. of the foregoing elements beyond a .. reasonable :doubt, ·then yeu must 
find the defendant ·guilty of Threatening •with or Using a Dangerou~ ·Weapon in .ij Fight or 
Quarrel;-~ .cb'A:ged ,in Count II of the -infonnation. .If, .on the other hand, .. you are not ccmvinced 
! . 
ibeyond a r~asonable: do.tibt-of any ·one or more of the foregoing elements,. then you must find. the 
I 




INSTRUCTION NO. 1-'t 
l3.·efqre .you ·can convict the,defendant, Chadley Keith· Calvert, ofahe= crime -of Aggravated 
Assault,. as-·lchargecl -in Count I ·of the infonnatior,i:, yo11 must find· fr.en~ an of.the evidence and 
l 
beyond a r;~asonable doubt, each' .and every one of the following elements .of that offense 
i ' . 
occur;clng-0.~ or-·.b.~fore the 16.th d~y of Ju]y, 2012, fu SaltLake County, State ofUtah; 
1. I Thafthe .. de~endant, Chadley Keith:Calvert committed.an act ofassatilt up.on H~go 
H~~g~;--and 
2. That-such attempt or act was committed intentionally-or knowingly; and 
3. Tha:t.:the defendant used a dangerous weapon. 
lf, :after ¢·areful consideration of all .. of the·evidence in this case.,: . .YOU are cpnvinced.ofthe 
tr.uth of.each and every one of the foregoing ·e1ements beyond ·a reasonable doubt, then you must 
ijn(l ~~ d.ef~nd~t,;gµilty .of Aggravated As~ault- as charg~d.m Count 1 .(;)rthe inf.erro~tion.: It; on 
! . 
the ·other-li~ci,: ye.tl .are not ·COil'.\t.inceci .beyond a ·reasonable doubt of ·any one 0i" more. :of .the 
I 




THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, VERDICT 
COUNT 1 
Chadley Keith Calvert, 
Defendant 
Case No.121400830 
We, the jurors in the above case, unanimously find the defendant, Chadley 
Keith Calvert: 
./ Guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Aggravated Assault; 
Not guilty of Aggravated Assault. 
Dated this _j__ day of fY½L . 2014. 
~OY @....aye&_ 
Foreperson oft9.~Jury_ 
Filed _s;J'.:l~~;:~~,'.:. ;i2014. 
By (IIi'.i~ItJ 
0000166 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTt STATE OF UTAH 
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, VERDICT 
COUNT2 
Chadley Keith Calvert, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 121400830 
We, the jurors in the above case, unanimously find the defendant, Chadley 
Keith Calvert: 
_:L__ Guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Threatening with a Dangerous 
We~pon in a Fight or Quarrel; 
Not guilty of Threatening with a Dangerous Weapon in a Fight or 
Quarrel. 
Dated this __ day of V"Yl AY 2014. 
0000167 <u 
Tab D 
HOLLADAY JUSTICE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLADAY CITY vs. CHADLEY K CALVERT 
CASE NUMBER 081000542 Other Misdemeanor 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 76-5-102 - SIMPLE ASSAULT Class B Misdemeanor 
Offense Date: October 26, 2008 
Plea: November 26, 2008 Not Guilty 
Disposition: February 02, 2009 Dismissed (w/o prej) 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
DANIEL BAY GIBBONS 
PARTIES 
Defendant - CHADLEY K CALVERT 
Plaintiff - HOLLADAY CITY 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: CHADLEY K CALVERT 
Date of Birth: September 04, 1969 
Law Enforcement Agency: SL SHERIFF/ UNIF PD 
Prosecuting Agency: HOLLADAY CITY 
Citation Number: 1169675 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
~ PROCEEDINGS 
11-03-08 ARRAIGNMENT scheduled on November 26, 2008 at 10:00 AM in 
HOLLADAY COURT with Judge GIBBONS. 
11-03-08 Notice - NOTICE for Case 081000542 ID 2473360 
ARRAIGNMENT is scheduled. 
Date: 11/26/2008 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: HOLLADAY COURT 
4580 SOUTH 2300 EAST 
HOLLADAY, UT 84117 
Before Judge: DANIEL BAY GIBBONS 
11-03-08 Case filed 
Printed: 04/11/16 15:03:38 Page 1 
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CASE NUMBER 081000542 Other Misdemeanor 
11-03-08 Judge DANIEL BAY GIBBONS assigned. 
11-10-08 Note: CHADLEY K CALVERT called to verify court time and date 
11-26-08 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on January 09, 2009 at 11:00 AM 
in HOLLADAY COURT with Judge GIBBONS. 
11-26-08 Minute Entry - Minutes for Arraignment 






The Information is read. 
Advised of rights and penalties. 
The defendant is advised of right to counsel. 
Defendant is arraigned. 
The defendant is advised that this offense may be used as an 
enhancement to the penalties for a subsequent offense. 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 01/09/2009 
Time: 11:00 a.m. 
Location: HOLLADAY COURT 
4580 SOUTH 2300 EAST 
HOLLADAY, UT 84117 
Before Judge: DANIEL BAY GIBBONS 
01-09-09 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on February 06, 2009 at 10:00 AM in 
HOLLADAY COURT with Judge GIBBONS. 
01-09-09 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference 
Judge: DANIEL BAY GIBBONS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: candicel 
Prosecutor: LOPRESTO II, THOMAS V 
Defendant 
Defendant prose 
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CASE NUMBER 081000542 Other Misdemeanor 
HEARING 
Deft appeared and no resolution reached. 
BENCH TRIAL is scheduled. 
Date: 02/06/2009 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: HOLLADAY COURT 
4580 SOUTH 2300 EAST 
HOLLADAY, UT 84117 
Before Judge: DANIEL BAY GIBBONS 
01-26-09 Filed return: Subpoena; Camille Little 
Party Served: Jessica Martinez-Niece 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: January 21, 2009 
01-26-09 Filed: information 
01-26-09 Issued: Subpoena Deputy Child, Camille Little 
Clerk candicel 
Hearing Date: February 06, 2009 
02-02-09 Charge 1 Disposition is Dismissed 
Time: 10:00 
02-06-09 Minute Entry - Minutes for Pretrial Conference 
Judge: DANIEL BAY GIBBONS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: candicel 
Prosecutor: MILLER, LORENZO K 
Defendant 
Defendant prose 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MIKE LARENCE 
HEARING 
Companian case unpon motion from prosecution case dismissed. 
02-09-09 Case Closed 
Disposition Judge is DANIEL BAY GIBBONS 
02-09-09 Charge 1 Disposition is Dismissed 
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